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Abstract  
This paper presents the contribution of the pragmatic sociology of critical capacities to the 
understanding of environmental conflicts. In the field of “environmental valuation”, 
nowadays colonised by economics, the approach of plural modes (or “regimes”) of 
engagement provides a sociological understanding of the unequal power of conflicting 
“languages of valuation”. This frame entails a shift from “values” to “modes of valuation” 
and links modes of valuation to modes of practical engagement and coordination with the 
surrounding environment. Different social sources of incommensurability are thus detected 
and reframed as critical tension within and among modes of human coordination with the 
environment.  
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Introduction 
In this paper I discuss the contribution that the “sociology of critical capacities” – also known 
as French pragmatic sociology – initiated by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (Boltanski 
and Thévenot, 1999; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) makes to the study of environmental 
conflicts. Emerging in France in the 1980s, as a challenge to Pierre Bourdieu’s “critical 
sociology”, this approach has progressively elicited an international echo and is today a key 
reference in the European debate.1 Environmental conflicts have proved to be among the most 
fruitful fields of application of French pragmatic sociology in recent years2. This should not 
be surprising given the fundamental contribution of Bruno Latour’s works to the development 
of this approach (Guggenheim and Potthast, 2012). In fact, one of the most innovative traits 
of the “pragmatic turn” in French sociology (Dosse, 1999) is to consider “nonhumans” as 
“agents”, assuring and stabilising coordination between human beings.  
The concepts of “hybrid forum”, “translation”, “framing” and “overflowing” elaborated by 
Michel Callon to address environmental disputes have greatly contributed to a more accurate 
sociological analysis of what economists (and increasingly activists, politicians and citizens) 
call “environmental externalities” (Callon, 1998; Callon et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the actor-
network approach fails to provide an account of what translations – and mediations – entail in 
terms of the need to conciliate competing and incommensurable “languages of valuation” of 
the environment. The unequal power of these languages has been put forward as a reason that 
accounts for forms of oppression in contemporary environmental conflicts (Martinez-Alier, 
                                       
1 For a general presentation and discussion of French pragmatic sociology see Bénatouïl (1999), Dodier (1993), 
Silber (2003), Wagner (1999) and the special issue of the European Journal of Social Theory edited by Blokker 
(2011). For a review of North American and European research on sociology of valuation and evaluation, to 
which French pragmatic sociology has given an important contribution, see Lamont (2012).  
2 See in particular the research conducted by Claudette Lafaye and Laurent Thévenot on environmental conflicts 
in France and the U.S. (Lafaye and Thévenot, 1993; Lafaye, Moody and Thévenot, 2000; Moody and Thévenot, 
2000).  
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2002; 2008). Moreover, value incommensurability is frequently mobilised to provide an 
account of why environmental conflicts so often turn into “intractable controversies” (Schön 
and Rein, 1994; Pellizzoni, 2003).  
I argue that in the field of “environmental valuation”, nowadays colonised by economics, 
pragmatic sociology could make a significant contribution by clarifying some of the 
underlying sociological issues accounting for these problems of incommensurability. The 
shift that pragmatic sociology promotes from values to modes of valuation and the link it 
establishes between modes of valuation and modes of action – these latter intended as modes 
of practical engagement and coordination with the environment – allow different social 
sources of incommensurability to be distinguished. 
My argument is divided into four steps. First, I introduce the debate on incommensurability in 
environmental valuation, focusing on how it has been developed in the field of ecological 
economics and showing some sociological dimensions of the problem that have not been 
adequately addressed in this literature. Second, I introduce the pragmatic sociology approach 
to valuation. I argue that the most original contribution of this approach rests on showing a 
link between the modern construction of a precise “grammar” of the legitimacy of public 
valuation (the public justifiable valuation) and an idea of universal justice to which 
commensuration is fundamental. However, the public grammar of the valuable is far from 
being the only relevant language of valuation to which people have recourse. Following 
Thévenot (2006, 2007), two other grammars of the valuable can be identified: one based on 
functional utility, the other on familiarity and affection. Third, on this basis, I detail a first 
type of problem of incommensurability with which we are confronted in environmental 
conflicts, which I suggest should be defined as “order incommensurability”. In this case, to 
commensurate is difficult, since multiple competing logics of general commensuration (or 
“orders of worth”) can be mobilised by agents to define the value of the environment. 
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Commensuration, however, is considered as the convenient mode of engagement with the 
environment: the problem is thus to find agreement on the appropriate logic of 
commensuration. This agreement is usually found through “public compromises” between 
incommensurable principle of valuation. The fourth step is designed to show the relevance in 
environmental conflicts of a different kind of problem of incommensurability: radical (or 
“constitutive”) incommensurability. When radical incommensurability is at stake, we are 
confronted with languages and practices of valuation that are based on modes of engagement 
with the environment which do not rely on commensuration but on intimate and personal 
attachments to the environment built through familiarization. I will define this specific kind of 
engagement with the environment in terms of “dwelling”. When dwelling, the human-
environment relation is both that of a biological space to which human vital functions are 
connected and that of a “milieu” – a material and social place of proximity – in which the 
person and some of her capacities are “distributed” (Breviglieri, 2012). In conclusion, I 
discuss the political and ecological relevance of these modes of valuation based on familiarity 
and the challenges raised by the need to include them in the process of public decision-
making. 
Problems of incommensurability in environmental valuation  
Incommensurability is a key concept of the critique addressed by ecological economics to the 
neoclassical economic understanding of problems of environmental valuation.3 In standard 
environmental economics, “environmental valuation” is a matter of putting a (market) price 
on the environment. The virtue of pricing environmental goods and functions is to allow 
commensuration between alternative options or courses of action. According to the utilitarian 
                                       
3 See Spash (1999), Martinez-Alier (2002) and Gowdy and Erickson (2005). On the limits of the market 
approach to environmental issues see especially O’Neill (2007).  
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approach, which provides the theoretical basis of this mainstream economic approach, 
commensuration is a prerequisite for rational decisions.  
In contrast, many of the economists joining ecological economics reframe environmental 
valuation as an “open social process”, in which problems of value incommensurability are 
unavoidable. Value incommensurability – i.e., the existence of plural ways to value the 
environment irreducible to a single common standard of valuation – is presented as “a 
foundation stone for ecological economics” (Martinez-Alier, O’Neill and Munda, 1998). 
In reframing environmental valuation as a social process, ecological economists rely upon the 
philosophical critique of the generalised commensurability implied by utilitarianism. 
According to this critique, incommensurability is unavoidable, since the goods a human being 
pursues in life so as to flourish are radically multiple.4 More specifically, vis-à-vis the 
generalised possibility of trade-offs assumed in the utilitarian tradition, the concept of 
“constitutive incommensurabilities” (Raz, 1986: 345-353) has been coined to point to certain 
social relations and evaluative commitments whose existence implies a refusal to trade them 
off: love and friendship are usually invoked as examples of such social relations, as well as 
certain modes of attachment to the environment (O’Neill et al., 2008: 79; Espeland, 1994). 
Ecological economists rely on this critique of utilitarianism to challenge the idea of public 
decisions as “algorithmic solutions”. As an alternative, deliberative models for decision-
making are discussed as a possible way to take into account diverse modes of valuation in 
environmental problems.5 The decision is analysed as the result of deliberation on 
                                       
4 The philosophical debate on value incommensurability was particularly lively at the end of the 1990s. See the 
book edited by Chang (1997) and the special issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review edited by 
Adler (1998). See also Sunstein (1994) and Nussbaum (2001). As noted by D’Agostino (2003), the philosophical 
debate has largely ignored the important sociological discussions on commensuration as a social phenomenon. 
See, in particular, Espeland and Stevens (1998) and Desrosières (1990; 1992; 1998).  
5	   See the contributions collected in the book edited by Foster (1997). In addition, a “social multi-criteria” 
approach to decision has been promoted (Munda 2008), in which different forms of valuing a specific 
environment can be expressed and then combined, allowing for certain trade-offs to be excluded, especially – but 
not exclusively – for ecological reasons.	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environmental values, involving those who are affected by the decision process output. The 
direct implication of the so-called “stakeholders” in framing the decision process is proposed 
as a way to deal, not only with the pluralism of modes of valuation, but also with the “radical 
uncertainty” and ignorance that are distinctive traits, at the epistemic level, of environmental 
issues. That is why it has been suggested that ecological economics should be developed as a 
“post-normal science” and submitted to an “extended peer-review” process (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz 1994). 
The idea that valuation is a “social process” to which incommensurability is key has become 
very popular in ecological economics literature. However, we can detect some sociological 
blind spots in the way in which environmental valuation is addressed as a social process in 
this debate. First of all, “values” are used as a sort of “black box” to point to alternative, non-
economic definitions of the valuable (i.e., not based on prices) without explaining why some 
of these definitions appear as more legitimate than others in the space of deliberation. 
Moreover, it is not clear in what terms “constitutive incommensurability” represents a specific 
challenge to deliberation.  
In order to understand conflicts between different languages and practices of valuation of the 
environment, one must first define in what terms economic valuation is related to other non-
economic forms of valuation. Second, it is critical to explore the specific “grammar” of 
valuation on which public deliberation relies in our modern societies. However, in order to 
answer these questions, we need first of all to specify in what terms conflicting languages and 
practices of valuation differ.  
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Explaining languages and practices of valuation through regimes 
of engagement 
In pragmatic sociology, the variety of modes of valuation is considered to be related to the 
same dynamic that explains the variety observable in human action. Valuation is in fact 
understood as the result of an evaluative judgment through which agents frame a given 
situation in order to carry out “the appropriate action” (Thévenot, 1990; Boltanski and 
Thévenot: 2006: 349). This judgement orients how they establish a relation (that is, engage 
and coordinate) with the surrounding environment and results in attributions of value to 
human and non-human beings. Action is thus understood as engagement and coordination 
with the environment: coordination is possible if actors share the same evaluative judgment 
on the situation, which implies sharing the same mode of engaging with human and non-
human beings involved in the situation and to value them.  
The judgement of “appropriateness” of an action to a given situation is considered crucial to 
the understanding of human action and implies an evaluative moment in its unfolding. This 
evaluation is based on the good that the agent can pursue through coordination with the social 
and material environment. Three types of good are referred to in pragmatic sociology as 
generally recognised in our societies as guiding human action: the “ease” of accommodation 
with a familiar and appropriated environment; the good of the fulfilment of a planned action; 
the “common good” beneficial to the polity as a whole (Thévenot, 1990; 2001; 2006; 2007).6 
                                       
6	  By “common good”, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) refer to a political and historical construction: that of a 
principle of evaluation endowed with universality and intended to organise the polity as an ordered equilibrium 
oriented toward justice.	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On this basis, three main registers or modes of action – called “regimes of engagement” – are 
identified: the familiar regime, the regime in a plan (or normal regime of action) and the 
public justification regime (Boltanksi and Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, 2007).7  
The public justification regime of action has been the most extensively explored and 
discussed. It defines a mode of action and valuation, which is required by an agent in order to 
ensure the largest possible coordination – a “public” coordination – open potentially to every 
human being. In fact, according to Boltanski and Thévenot the “justifiable action” and its 
specific mode of valuation are the cornerstone of the modern construction of the “public 
sphere” as a distinct sphere of social life. The construction of the public sphere goes hand in 
hand with the definition of a specific mode of engagement and valuation of the surrounding 
human and material environment that is required for agents. In the way the public sphere has 
historically been built, the engagement required of agents is based on the qualification of 
human and non-human beings according to their worthiness in terms of a legitimate definition 
of the common good. Consequently, legitimate attributions of value are those establishing an 
order (of people and things in the situation) that is fair and just, since it respects their worth as 
evaluated from the standpoint of the common good.  
The fairness and justice of these attributions of value are proved through appropriate “tests of 
reality”. The concept of test of reality is key to the pragmatic understanding of evaluative 
practices’ guiding action, and it is one of the most original contributions this approach 
provides for understanding legitimacy and justifiability in our societies. In the course of 
action, agents test the appropriateness of their evaluation, having recourse to specific objects 
and instruments expressly conceived or formatted to assess value or to more or less 
                                       
7 “Regimes of engagement” are descriptive models of action. They are not the reconstruction of social reality and 
of its objective structures, nor are they predictive models of phenomena or behaviours. They look to clearly 
define the competences and resources to which each actor should have recourse, in order to produce a certain 
type of coordination with the social and material environment within a given context. Each model of action thus 
has its own corresponding “grammar” (Boltanski, 1990; Thévenot, 1990). 
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formalized valuation practices involving the material surroundings. In the public regime of 
action, tests of reality are performed through instruments and equipment that objectively 
assess worth by establishing a “space of equivalence” based on the common good as the 
evaluative standpoint (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 133-138).8 Consequently, 
commensuration is the operation at the heart of the reality tests designed to assess the 
legitimacy of a public attribution of worth. 
The authors point out a specific feature of our modern society that accounts for its 
complexity: different definitions of the worth of people and things are equally held as 
publicly legitimate. In fact, plural specifications of the common good have historically 
emerged, implying that plural legitimate “orders of worth” are possible in our societies. In 
their research on practical modes of justification, Boltanski and Thévenot detect six different 
expressions of the common good in our society, defining these justifiable social and economic 
general orders by their corresponding modes of valuation: market competition, industrial 
efficiency, fame, civic solidarity, domestic trust, inspiration. As historically-defined 
conceptual constructions, orders of worth are not limited to these six, and new orders can 
always emerge, as shown by the work of Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) on the network-
based worth of contemporary capitalism and – especially relevant for environmental valuation 
– by the quite problematic emerging “green” order of worth discussed by Lafaye and 
Thévenot (1993).9 The result is that, in our societies, plural legitimate logics of 
commensuration can be used to define a general order.10  
                                       
8 For a synthesis of the discussion of objectivity from a pragmatic perspective, in terms of modes of 
“objectivation” implying a material intervention – or “investment” – to “format” the environment of action, see 
Centemeri (2012).  
9	   Lafaye and Thévenot point out the difficulties of defining “forms of equivalence” that can allow for the 
existence of strong “tests of reality” of ecological worth. Moreover, the ecological order would entail enlarging 
the class of beings deserving of moral consideration beyond the “common humanity”. This hypothesis radically 
challenges the model of polity on which orders of worth rely. On this point see Latour (1998) and Blok (2013).  
10	  Commensurating is thus not necessarily monetising. Money is, historically, the most relevant tool ensuring 
commensuration in our societies, and the logics of using it so are plural, yet we can commensurate without 
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Compared to the justifiable action, the “normal action” and the “familiar engagement” point 
to modes of coordination and valuation whose extension and public legitimacy are more 
limited. They are restricted, respectively, to those having a stake in the action and to those 
familiar with the environment. Consequently, moving from the normal action to the 
familiarity regime, the reality tests through which agents check on the appropriateness of their 
evaluation of the situation are progressively less dependent on a general standard assessing 
functions and needs and more embedded in knowledge produced and shared through a 
personalised practice.  
Reading action through this plurality of modes of engagement, pragmatic sociology leads us 
to consider the human agent as plural in his/her ways to be an “agent-in-the-environment”. 
The same person is capable of different kinds of agency – understood as diverse kinds of 
capacity to act – which are sustained by different modes of engaging with the environment: 
the personality with attachments in the familiar engagement, the individual with autonomy 
and interests in the normal action, the person acting for the common good in the justification 
regime. Accordingly, the surrounding environment is cognitively framed by agents as the 
familiar environment, functional objects, or conventional entities. Thus, the relevant 
information for testing the appropriateness of action depends on the mode of engagement with 
the environment: perceptual clues in the familiar regime, the ordinary language of functions 
and needs in the normal action, and codified language in the public action.  
What I am interested in is that each regime points to a “practical grammar” of valuation. 
Valuation is based on legitimate conventions related to orders of worth in the justification 
regime: on utility in the regime of normal action; on personal attachments in the familiar 
                                                                                                                       
necessarily using money. (Zelizer 1997). Moreover, the choice to speak about “worth” instead of “value” is 
related to the fact that pragmatic sociology tries to overcome the so-called “Parsons’ pact” (Stark, 2009: 7): that 
is, the clear-cut distinction between economic value (the legitimate domain of economics) and social values (the 
legitimate domain of sociology). For a discussion of incommensurability in terms of a social phenomenon 
anchored in the assumed divide between economic value and social values, as related to different spheres of life, 
see Trainor (2006).	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regime. The possibility of sharing these languages and practices of valuation with others, thus 
assuring coordination and agreement, is unequal. When an evaluation is based on the 
reference to a legitimate order of worth, the possibility of agreement or disagreement on the 
valuable is open to a “generalised third party”, since the value can be objectively tested 
through appropriate instruments and tools collectively devised for this purpose (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006). The conventions that qualify and frame the entities involved, according to 
general categories of worth, allow for an objective test of the value without requiring direct, 
in-depth knowledge of the situation. In contrast, agreement or disagreement requires a shared 
and direct experience of familiarisation when an evaluation is based on the familiar 
engagement. Nevertheless, far from being limited to the sphere of “the private”, valuations 
resting on the ease ensured by personal arrangements can be shared with others, since they are 
understandable to others, they can be communicated and they can sustain critical claims. 
However, critique based on valuations resting on familiarity cannot be easily expressed in the 
public space. The latter is historically and culturally built on the principle that legitimate 
forms of valuation require a “detached” perspective with regard to the relevant features 
accounting for the worth or the utility of something or someone: they require objectivity 
(Porter, 1995). Forms of valuing based on personal attachments can be understood by others 
and shared with them, but they are not acceptable as such as legitimate arguments in the 
public debate, where they have to be either translated (into interests) or compatibilized 
(through mediation) with legitimate definitions of worth (Doidy, 2003; Richard-Ferroudji, 
2011). This is a structural reason accounting for the unequal power of languages of valuation 
observable in public deliberation. Similarly, the increasing importance attributed, for the 
legitimacy of public decision-making, to instruments such as cost-benefit analysis, creates a 
bias in favour of expressions of worth based on price and efficiency, denoting a strictly 
quantified expression of value. This has progressively reduced the place for justifiable modes 
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of valuation, like the domestic one, which rely on appreciations of worth that are less bound 
to a quantified expression of value and that can be more “hospitable”, I will argue, to 
valuations based on familiarity.  
The value of the environment in the public space: 
incommensurability as “order incommensurability”  
If we conceive action as engagement and coordination with the environment, there is an inner 
tension, thus revealed, in the very word “environment” and its uses in our societies, with 
major consequences for understanding environmental valuation conflicts. In fact, what we call 
the “Environment” (meaning “Nature”) is revealed as a specific way to qualify the environs or 
surroundings of some person, being or community, and to engage with it, in terms of public or 
normal action. In these two modes of action, a (human) subject is separated from and 
confronted with a (non-human) object, whereas in the familiar engagement, the frontier 
between subject and object is blurred. 
In the public sphere, the environment matters as “Nature”. The legitimate public modes of 
valuing nature are plural, and they unevenly rely on quantified and measurable expressions of 
value. Nature can be valued as “heritage”, according to a domestic worth; or as expression of 
“wilderness”, according to an inspired worth; or as a “place of renown”, according to a worth 
based on fame. These “orders of worth” are examples of legitimate public modes of valuation 
that do not rely on a strictly quantified definition of value. Yet general, agreed-upon modes of 
objectifying value are at work here, based on codified knowledge and expert judgment that 
guarantee the possibility of ordering. When nature is valued as an “economic good” according 
to a market worth, or as a resource for production according to an industrial worth, quantified 
modes of valuation are introduced, in terms of prices or efficiency indicators. Nature can also 
be valued as a “public good” to which collective rights are associated: we can, then, speak of 
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a civic mode of  environment valuation. The increasing relevance of “biodiversity” as an 
expression of environmental value shows the progressive construction of a specific “green” 
order of worth based largely on scientific modes of quantification that seek to reveal the 
interdependencies linking – on ecological bases – the local to the global and the present to the 
future (Lafaye and Thévenot, 1993). 
These plural modes of valuation all rest on an identical mode of engagement with the 
environment, which is the publicly justifiable mode of engagement: the environment is 
framed by agents through general and agreed upon categories of qualification. The 
environment is always a “qualified” environment: it is framed as the expression of a 
legitimate common good.   
It is thus possible to identify a first kind of problem of incommensurability, with which we are 
confronted in environmental valuation conflicts. I propose to define it in terms of order 
incommensurability. By “problem of order incommensurability”, I mean a critical situation in 
which there is difficulty in agreeing, in the public space, on the criteria of commensuration 
that are pertinent to test the legitimacy of a decision or action. When confronted with a 
problem of order incommensurability, disputes and controversies involve disagreement on 
how to commensurate, but they do not involve whether to commensurate. The conflicting 
valuations at stake all rest on a public justification engagement of the agents with the 
environment. The conflict does not involve the nature of the appropriate evaluative judgment: 
it involves the common good sought through coordination. The modes of valuation that 
sustain a coordination oriented towards market competition are not the same as those 
sustaining a coordination to achieve industrial efficiency, or civic solidarity. However, in all 
these cases, the kind of engagement with the environment required from agents is the same 
and it requires commensuration in order to successfully coordinate with others. 
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The question that arises is how an agreement can be reached notwithstanding order 
incommensurability. A possible way out of this dilemma is to have one principle that 
dominates over the others. But from the evidence collected by Boltanski and Thévenot, the 
most frequent scenario is that of conflicting valuations reconciled in a “composite 
arrangement” or “compromise”. In a compromise held in public – which is different from a 
private arrangement reached by mutual agreement of the actors involved or the negotiation of 
interests – the imperative of justification is not satisfied, but neither is it completely lost  sight 
of: “In a compromise, the participants do not attempt to clarify the principle of their 
agreement; they are favourably disposed toward the notion of a common good without 
actively seeking one” (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 277-278). In a compromise, different 
logics of commensuration are brought together to structure spaces of equivalence that are not 
completely coherent but are solid enough to sustain a justifiable evaluative judgment and the 
ensuing attributions of value.11 
We can find such a compromise of valuations in apparently technical objects such as 
economic techniques of environmental valuation. These instruments usually incorporate 
plural ways of valuing the environment, beyond just market valuation, even if they ultimately 
produce a price for the environment. But this price is not a pure market price. The emphasis 
on price masks the importance of the “conventions of quantification” (Desrosières 1990), 
based on diverse principles of evaluation and coordination other than market principles.12 
                                       
11	  In the domain of the environment, an example of what Boltanski and Thévenot call a “public arrangement for 
the common good” is the reference to “sustainable development” (Godard, 2003). Sustainable development 
refers to a largely underspecified “common good”. That is why we can encounter so many different definitions 
of sustainability. Nevertheless, arrangements for sustainable development can be defended in public and they 
justify decisions and agreements or enable critique.	  
12	  See on this point the contribution to institutional economics by French Convention Theory (Dupuy et al., 
1989; Favereau and Lazega, 2003; Thévenot et al., 2005). This economic approach has been developing in 
constant dialogue with pragmatic sociology. Economic value is shown as the result of “conventions” framing the 
reality according to definitions of the worth that are based on “compromises” between a market value and other 
logics of worth. Social values are, then, at work at the very heart of the construction of economic value in the 
conventions of qualification and quantification, which are necessary to define what is an economic good. This 
approach has been very fruitful for understanding issues of quality in economic life.   
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An example of an analysis of economic valuation techniques, as objects incorporating 
compromises between diverse principles of justification, can be found in the research by 
Marion Fourcade on environmental damage valuation in France and the US (Fourcade, 2011). 
Interested in understanding the significant difference observed in court settlements following 
oil spills on the coast of Brittany in 1978 (the Amoco-Cadiz disaster) and Alaska in 1989 (the 
Exxon-Valdez disaster), the author shows how the techniques chosen to give a monetary 
valuation of the ecological damage in the two national contexts are heavily influenced by the 
specific forms of valuing “nature” that have emerged historically in the French and US 
cultures. 
In the French case, following Fourcade’s analysis, the way to discuss environmental valuation 
and compensation is dominated by a representation of nature as “domestic nature”, that is, as 
an asset of the impacted region. The claim to ecological damage is left by the State to local 
populations and translated in terms of three different damages: “reputational loss” (loss of 
enjoyment of the area), the actual and future expenses necessary to restore coastal habitats 
and the loss of productive potential. Dimensions of industrial worth are taken into account 
here, together with market and fame valuations (summarized as reputational loss). The result 
is a composite qualification of the damage as damage to a “domestic” environment – not to 
“nature” – that is, to Brittany, as a specific cultural, economic and political region.  
On the contrary, in the Exxon-Valdez case, the environmental damage was considered as 
damage to a “wild” and “untouched” nature: the shore of Alaska. In this case, compensation 
was meant to redress damage affecting the “wilderness”. The valuation promoted was based 
on “inspiration”, the beauty of wild nature, together with an ecological principle 
(biodiversity). The compensation process shows how the “inspired” and “ecological” 
valuations were “compatibilised” with a market valuation.  
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The technique chosen to monetise the damage caused by the oil spill was “contingent 
valuation”, a controversial technique which is grounded on “stated preferences” (O’Neill, 
1997; Milanesi 2011). In fact, this technique is based on surveys on the “willingness to pay”, 
in order to approach the representativeness that an anonymous market mechanism is supposed 
to ensure. In this specific case, the survey was designed to define the value that a pristine 
Prince William Sound, the bay affected by the spill, has for people who do not live in this 
specific region but might be interested in visiting it. The idea is to define the “lost use values” 
of the US, as a nation, following the accident. In fact, inhabitants of the affected region were 
explicitly excluded from the surveys: their way of judging the value of their environment was 
not considered representative, precisely because it was their environment. Contingent 
valuation is meant to reveal the value of “pristine nature” for the US public “in general”, 
understood as a public of individuals with preferences and using these preferences as the basis 
for negotiation: it is the general (detached) attribution of value a “consumer” of “wilderness” 
would give to the affected area that matters as legitimate valuation.  
Fourcade’s research shows that valuation techniques establish a compromise between diverse 
attributions of value to the environment, temporarily “taming” order incommensurability. 
Moreover, behind these techniques of valuation, we can detect different ideas of the public 
and of public legitimacy. While in France, public legitimacy seems firmly grounded in the 
pursuit of the common good, in the American case, legitimacy is achieved through the 
expression of individual preferences and their negotiation, assuming a generalized possibility 
of trade-off. That is one of the reasons why, in the US case, the market order of worth plays 
such a central role in public life (Lamont and Thévenot, 2000).  
Nevertheless, indirect indications of a different kind of problem of incommensurability can be 
detected in Fourcarde’s article. As the author briefly mentions in her reconstruction of the US 
case, a separate claim by Native Alaskan tribes of injury to their special, collective way of life 
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was rejected in court. She explains that 37.7% of the 900 million dollars compensation Exxon 
paid to the state and federal governments was used to buy out parcels of lands, mainly from 
Native American tribes, and set them aside for habitat protection. In a note, she adds that this 
policy has been highly controversial among Native Alaskans and she mentions a very tense 
relationship between Natives and ecologists. I argue that a specific problem of 
incommensurability, different from the problem of order incommensurability I have just 
discussed, is raised by the Native tribes’ claim to the environment as a place of dwelling, not 
as wild nature. 
Valuing the environment as a place of dwelling: a “radical 
incommensurability” 
In 1997 a group of Alaska Natives filed a class action against Exxon claiming non-economic 
damage to their “subsistence way of life”. This latter is defined by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals judging their claim as “dependent upon the preservation of uncontaminated natural 
resources, marine life and wildlife”, and reflecting “a personal, economic, psychological, 
social, cultural, communal and religious form of daily living”.13  
The Court, however, considered that the injury suffered by the Alaska Natives was different 
in magnitude, but not in kind, compared to the injury suffered by other Alaskans. Their injury 
was equivalent to the loss of individual enjoyment of environmental goods, such as the right 
to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated nature, and cultivate traditional, cultural, 
spiritual and psychological benefits in pristine natural surroundings. Translated in this way, 
the loss by the Inuit communities was not deemed compensable as a different and specific 
injury. In fact, this translation of their loss in legal terms is based on an evaluation of the 
environmental damage that relies on the assumption that they are individuals who have a 
                                       
13	  In re Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 1997), emphasis mine. 	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functional relationship with the environment. Normal engagement, in which what is valuable 
is what is useful for the individual, is assumed to be the “natural” reference to judge the 
relationships with the environment and the damage suffered following its disruption.  
My argument is that the Alaskan Natives’ claim, which can be seen as a claim for the legal 
acknowledgment of a “distinctive” relationship between indigenous peoples and their 
surroundings,14 points, in fact, to a specific mode of valuing the environment, which rests on 
an engagement on the basis of familiarity such as we all know and experience. Nevertheless, 
the extent to which the modes of valuation of this specific engagement with the environment 
are secured by the material and cultural devices structuring life in common in a political 
community is quite diverse across cultures. The emergence of a public dimension of 
collective life in Western societies came with the primacy accorded to engagements with the 
human and material surroundings based on the separation between subjects and objects, and 
between nature and culture.15 
The Inuit case confronts us with a situation in which the political grammar structuring their 
life in common, their social and economic organisations, rests heavily on knowledge and 
valuation practices based on familiar engagement. In the liberal political grammar inspiring 
US and international institutions (of science, politics, law etc.), these practices and knowledge 
have been framed through the category of “indigenous culture”, which assures their political 
legitimacy in terms of cultural specificity, to which rights can be attributed. Stressing the 
existence of an indigenous specificity risks, however, eclipsing the peculiar composition of 
plural languages of valuation that we can observe in these communities. Inuits are capable of 
engaging in functional terms with their environment and publicly justifying their critiques and 
claims; but the relative place of these forms of engagement in the organisation of their life in 
                                       
14	  On this point, see Dannenmaier (2008).  
15	  On the modern western “exceptionalism” of structuring of the relation to the environment in terms of “nature”, 
see Latour (1993) and Descola (2005).	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common is different from that which we observe in our societies.  
An example of the kind of issue that I wish to raise is offered by Picou (2000) through his 
research on the “recovering” of the Inuit communities affected by the Exxon Valdez disaster. 
Involved in 1994 in the design and implementation of a participatory mental health project in 
the fishing community of Cordova, funded by the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ 
Advisory Council and meant to address the ongoing cultural and social disruption of Native 
communities after the spill, the author is confronted with the demand by the members of the 
Native Village of Eyak to hold a “talking circle” devoted to the Exxon Valdez disaster.  
As explained by the author, talking circles are a specific institution in Alaska Native culture 
through which villagers collectively address matters of concern related to their life in 
common. Talking circles are open to all members of the village and they are not the place for 
debate or argument: they are meant for sharing one’s feelings and thoughts with the rest of the 
village. That is why there are rules of confidentiality and uninterrupted discourse. 
A two-day talking circle was thus organised in January 1996 and reframed as “a participatory 
intervention strategy”. The author discusses how moments devoted to presenting scientific 
evidence of the environmental damage (such as ecological and economic damage) to the 
audience were followed by expressions of apology and sorrow (for all living creatures 
affected by the disaster) and “collective rituals” meant to restore and heal the environment. 
There was no lack of moments of denunciation, especially concerning Exxon’s 
responsibilities. However, the Talking Circle was not meant to be a place to build a public 
critique. It was a way of collectively dealing with the environmental damage, as damage 
affecting valuable goods from a perspective of a familiar engagement. From this perspective, 
the environment is valuable since it is a dwelled-in environment.  
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I use the expression dwelled-in environment to refer to a place that a person values because 
he/she moves and feels “at ease” in it, and because memories are deposited there.16 I consider 
a dwelled-in environment to be the environment we appropriate forging intimate bonds with 
human and non-human beings within it, thus creating a place in which interactions occur 
effortlessly. The person is “distributed” in his/her dwelled-in environment which becomes a 
constitutive part of the person so that, if affected, the consequences rebound directly on 
him/her. However, as the Inuit example shows, from an external, non familiar, point of view, 
the dwelled-in environment can be just as well a “natural” environment, even a “wilderness”. 
Although the damage to the dwelled-in environment is deeply personal, it can be shared with 
others. In the case of the Inuit, it is collectively acknowledged, and there is a specific 
procedure (the talking circle) to deal with it. However, as already discussed, the damage to the 
dwelled-in environment hardly fits the kind of formal requirements necessary for damage to 
be recognised in our legal and judiciary system, other than claiming that some sort of 
“cultural distinctiveness” should be preserved.  
But we miss the point if we jump to a catch-all category like “cultural distinctiveness”. The 
damage to a dwelled-in environment is not specific to indigenous cultures. Its recognition 
stems from an evaluative register that human beings, in general, rely on when engaging with 
the environment on the basis of familiarity. However, the existence of specific 
institutionalised forms assuring its consideration and communication (as is the case of the 
talking circle in the Inuit example) is culture-dependent. 
To further clarify this point, I will rely on the work of Claire Bouteloup (2008) on the 
                                       
16	  The anthropologist Tim Ingold (2000) has developed an approach to the perception of the environment in 
terms of “dwelling”, relying on the phenomenological tradition, especially Heidegger. The pragmatic approach I 
discuss here allows us to reframe “dwelling” as a specific mode of engagement with the environment, based on 
familiarity. This implies that the “dwelling” experience is not the exclusive way that humans relate to the world 
but a specific mode of coordination with the surrounding environment, which, even if crucial in providing the 
person an intimate self-assurance, is articulated with others that require a distinction between a subject and an 
object.  	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valuation of ecological damages following the Amoco-Cadiz oil spill.17 Bouteloup’s analysis 
shows how the qualification of the impacted environment in terms of Brittany’s specific 
environment gives rise to both a mode of valuation based on a domestic worth (as shown by 
Fourcade) and a recognition of personal attachments to the affected places in the form of a 
specific cultural identity shared by the inhabitants. As in the case of the Inuits, cultural 
identity is a way to have a distinct relationship with the environment publicly recognised. In 
the French case, however, the way to translate this attachment into a legitimate public claim is 
not to ask for the recognition of specific rights, but rather for the use of a qualification of the 
environmental damage according to a domestic worth.  
This difference between what we observe in the US case and in the French case is related to 
the specific construction of public justifiability that we find in France, in which, as 
highlighted by Fourcade, the reference to the common good is still crucial. Nevertheless, the 
inhabitants interviewed by Bouteloup also speak of additional dimensions of the damage 
caused by the oil spill, aspects that they share only in very limited circles of familiar people; 
they are ashamed or reticent to share such issues with non-familiar people (including the 
researcher), knowing that they lack public relevance. The loss of familiar habits of use and 
frequentation of their environments reveals a rich bundle of intimate relationships to beings 
(animals, plants), places and objects that the affected people value and cherish as a 
constitutive part of the persons they are. 
The damage to the dwelled-in environment, however, gives rise less to public denunciation 
than to forms of sharing and communicating in which empathy plays a crucial role, as in the 
Inuit talking circle, even if no institution of the kind exists in the French example.  
When studying environmental valuation conflicts concerning public decisions impacting the 
environment or compensations for environmental damage, we constantly come up against 
                                       
17	  See also the contribution of Bouteloup in Bouni et al., 2009.  
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attributions of value based on familiarity and the difficulty of integrating them into the public 
process of valuation to which objectivation is so central. We are constantly confronted with 
problems of radical or constitutive incommensurability.  
In fact, through familiar engagement, people develop attachments to beings and objects they 
value since the latter participate in maintaining their milieu, in which their person is 
distributed. They are valuable in a way that excludes commensuration, as commensuration 
would imply considering these persons, objects and other entities of the environment as 
separate and “equivalent” to others, according to a general qualification or a simple function.  
We can, of course, always commensurate them, but this would be meaningless from a 
dwelling perspective: to commensurate them would mean shifting to a different practical 
engagement with them. These radically incommensurable beings can be equally valuable to 
other people but not because we share a standard for judgement – which anyone, a generalised 
third party, could apply – but because we share the same kind of engagement with these very 
same beings. “Clues” to understanding the value “from within” are at stake here, not ciphers 
to decode what makes their worth “from without” (Ingold, 2000).   
Of course, we can commensurate the familiar entities to which we are attached, even trade 
them off, put a price on them or accept compensation as social recognition of our loss. But 
more often than not this would be a “tragic choice” (Nussbaum 2001), something we are 
forced to do, or at best a difficult choice that involves suffering. This difficulty and suffering 
are the sign that we are sacrificing something we value in a way that has no real equivalent. 
Final remarks  
Problems of incommensurability become a more precise object for sociological investigation 
when revisited in terms of critical tensions between modes of valuation based on diverse 
regimes of action and coordination with the environment.  
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In particular, this approach clarifies the terms in which it might be appropriate to speak about 
problems of “constitutive incommensurability” in environmental valuation. In fact, the 
experience of dwelling is based on a relation of proximity with the environment that resists 
commensuration because, through dwelling, things and persons are constituted as unique 
spatio-temporal particulars. This relationship is crucial (or “constitutive”) to the “consistency” 
of the person.18  
It is thus possible to investigate this radical incommensurability without jumping directly to 
catchall collective categories, such as cultural identity or sacredness, and to investigate the 
variety of ways in which people share and communicate with others this mode of valuing 
based on familiarity. A pragmatic approach – in this, differing from a phenomenological 
perspective – invites attentiveness to the variety of supports people rely on in order to 
communicate valuations based on a familiar engagement, according to the variable extension 
of the sought-after coordination: from situations in which this communication is confined to 
intimate relationships, to those cases in which communication aims to sustain a community of 
practices, to situations in which communication is meant to reach an extended political 
community. The important aspect to retain here is that modes of valuation that are radically 
incommensurable, since based on familiarity and personal attachments, can be shared with 
others and can support the constitution of forms of commonality (mise en commun), which do 
not, however, comply with the grammars of public legitimacy.  
Culture thus matters, since it provides resources (words, categories, cultural artefacts…) that 
can aid in the communication of modes of valuation based on familiarity. However, the need 
to share these radically incommensurable modes of valuation can also prompt innovation, as 
is the case of the new repertoires or styles of political activism that we can recognize in 
                                       
18	  From the original meaning of “standing firm”, in pragmatic sociology the term “consistency” points to the 
efforts a person makes to maintain an existential coherence through the multiple modes of action and 
engagement that are required for living in our societies. 	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today’s various expressions of environmental mobilisation. Activists in environmental 
struggles are often key actors in this innovation process aimed at finding original ways to 
bridge the gap between valuations of the environment as a place of familiar attachments, as a 
resource and as a “common good”, where the “commonality” is potentially extended to all of 
humanity. 
The French and US examples I have discussed throughout the paper show the interest of a 
comparative approach in terms of national cultures of environmental damage valuation, one 
that should not be limited to understanding the unequal importance attributed in different 
national contexts to certain legitimate orders of worth in the public space. The comparative 
approach allows us to identify the relevance, in our societies, of competing definitions of 
what accounts for public legitimacy: it can be justifiability according to a common good, 
requiring from people a public engagement; or the aggregation of individual preferences, 
requiring a normal action. In both cases, problems of incommensurability are crucial, but 
while, in the justification frame they are openly assumed in public discussion (as problems of 
order incommensurability) and only partially resolved (through compromise), in the public 
space as the space of aggregation of preferences, they are confined at best to individuals’ 
“interior forum”. At the same time, the comparative approach can reveal the existence of 
ways to create a commonality of valuation between people, starting from a familiar 
engagement: to what extent these modes of creating commonality can be taken into account 
when public decision-making and regulation are at stake is a question open to further analysis. 
More comparative research is needed in order to clarify the role that political cultures play in 
ensuring dialogue between diverse constructions of the public and diverse grammars of 
commonality based on familiarity.  
In this respect, studying how forms of valuation of the environment based on familiarity can 
contribute to a more accurate understanding of sustainability emerges as a particularly 
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relevant research field for future investigations. In fact, modes of valuation based on 
familiarity produce forms of knowledge and practices of intervention in the environment that 
can contribute to a more sustainable management, in ecological and social terms, of natural 
resources. One example is the case discussed by Charis Thompson (2002) of elephant 
conservation in the Kenyan Amboseli Park. The author shows how scientific knowledge can 
be an ally in revealing the role, in maintaining biodiversity, played by practices that are 
deeply embedded in traditional ways of living of local populations – in this case, the pastoral 
activities of the Maasai populations. This result is possible if scientists, such as David 
Western in the example analysed by Thompson, become sort of “familiar” to the places where 
they intervene, so as to be able to establish a fruitful dialogue with the local inhabitants. 
Place-attached experts can play a crucial role as mediators in having familiar languages and 
practices of valuation included in the definition of standards of management. Nevertheless, 
this same case study shows how taking into account local practices, and their integration in 
forms of ecological co-management, can engender long-standing tensions and conflicts, 
across local-global lines. In fact, the lack of solid “tests of reality” for judging the ecological 
worth – since the articulation between the local and the global is often uncertain or ignored – 
accounts for the potential fragility of these local arrangements. 
In any case, new forms of ecological collaborative management (or co-management) are 
being devised, in the North and in the South, through ongoing experiments developed in 
response to environmental challenges (climate change, loss of biodiversity, water-related 
issues,…). The study of these socio-technical experiments from the perspective of plural 
modes of engagement with the environment could offer the opportunity to further analyze 
how conditions are created – or not – for plural languages of valuation to coexist in socially 
and ecologically sound arrangements (Cheyns, 2011). Far from being exclusively a source of 
conflict and an obstacle to public decision-making, radical incommensurability can, one 
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hopes, be an opportunity for collective explorations of new modes of organizing our life in 
common, more respectful of our plural ways of engaging with our environments.  
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